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1.  Introduction 
The currency crises of the 1990s made fashionable the “bi-polar” model of 
exchange rate regime choice, according to which either extreme (a “hard” peg or 
a float) is preferable to an intermediate option.  In the view of Fischer (2001), the 
bi-polar model is primarily a criticism of soft pegs, rather than of other forms of 
intermediate regime such as a managed float. 
 
  As we shall see below, up to 1995 developing countries did indeed 
abandon soft pegs and go over to floating in some numbers, but that tendency 
has been reversed more recently.  It may well be that the disadvantages of soft 
pegs are less significant for countries that are not exposed to large capital flows, 
either because of capital controls or because of financial underdevelopment, and 
also that soft pegs have significant compensating advantages over managed 
floats which need to be taken into account.  The most obvious possibility that 
springs to mind, and the one which we investigate here, is whether soft pegs 
encourage price stability by imposing a significant degree of discipline on the 
monetary authorities. 
 
Much has been written recently about the classification of exchange rate 
regimes (ERRs), and their correlation with measures of macroeconomic 
performance such as inflation and growth. The conventional conclusion, based 
on official IMF classifications (which are essentially the declared regimes of each 
country), is that pegs of all kinds tend to be associated with lower inflation than 
floats (Bleaney and Fielding, 2000, 2002; Edwards, 1993; Ghosh et al., 1997, 2003; 
IMF, 1997).  Bleaney and Fielding (2002) find that hard pegs have even lower 
inflation than soft pegs.  There are however at least two reasons for re-examining 
these issues.  One is the possible endogeneity of the ERR, which can arise from 
the aggregation of various regime categories as well as for the usual econometric 
reasons.   Another is the recent concern that the ERRs in place differ significantly   3
from their official descriptions.  This has led some authors to develop de facto  
classifications using various methods (Bubula and Ötker-Robe, 2002; Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001; Poirson 2001).  Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) have 
extended the possibilities further by emphasising parallel-market rather than 
official exchange rates. 
 
We develop a data set based on the declared exchange rate regime back to 
1984, and check our results against the de facto classification of Bubula and Ötker-
Robe (2002). The main issues which we explore are: 
(1) Do hard pegs (e.g. a shared currency or a currency board) create significantly 
more monetary discipline than other pegs? 
(2) Is the distinction between de jure and de facto classifications important? 
(3) Which way does the causality run between inflation and exchange rate 
regimes? 
Our analysis starts from four principles. 
(1) If a pegged exchange rate is regarded as an attempt to import the anti-
inflation credibility of the anchor currency, then the empirical analysis of the 
ERR-inflation relationship should exclude anchor currencies.  Here we 
identify anchor currencies as those of the advanced countries. Developing 
countries lack the institutional strength of advanced countries (they emerge 
as consistently inferior in multi-dimensional measures of institutional 
quality), and are thus more likely to depend on an exchange rate peg rather 
than on domestic institutional arrangements as a nominal anchor. One index 
of this is that the median developing country has had significantly higher 
inflation than the median advanced country over the past twenty years.   
Although the currencies of smaller OECD countries tend not to be used as 
anchors, it is still convenient to exclude them in order to avoid the 
complications associated with the problem of how to classify the European 
Monetary System.   4
(2) The appropriate ERR classification depends on the issue under investigation, 
and is not likely to be the same if we are interested in, say, the degree of 
intervention rather than the ERR-inflation relationship.  In the latter case, it is 
particularly important to avoid the bias involved in using a classification 
scheme in which arrangements designed to allow a pegged regime to adapt 
to high inflation – such as a pre-announced crawl – are treated as   
“intermediate” (semi-floating). 
(3) Inflation in developing countries has fallen significantly during the 1990s, 
and therefore it is important to allow for shifts in the ERR-inflation 
relationship over time. 
(4) Because of the positively skewed nature of the inflation distribution, the 
treatment of outlying observations at the high end is important in any 
empirical analysis, and results needed to be tested for robustness to high-
inflation outliers. 
 
The structure of our paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple 
theoretical model. In Section 3 we discuss issues of exchange rate regime 
classification. Section 4 reports our results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Theory 
Suppose that the government cares about deviations of the real exchange rate 
from equilibrium, and about inflation relative to some target level. It may choose 
a floating exchange rate, in which case it can select monetary growth to hit its 
inflation target exactly, but then it has to accept whatever degree of real 
exchange rate volatility the market delivers. Alternatively it can peg the 
exchange rate to some anchor currency which is characterised by low inflation 
(below the government’s target), and can control real exchange rate volatility by 
the frequency of parity adjustments. The government’s loss function is:   5
 
  L = (d – d*)2 + E(Q – Q*)2 + nC       ( 1 )  
where d represents inflation in non-traded goods, d* the target rate of d, Q the 
real exchange rate (in logs), and Q*  the equilibrium or target real exchange rate, 
C is a cost which is incurred if a pegged exchange rate is adjusted, n is the 
frequency of exchange rate adjustments, and E is the expectations operator.   
Equation (1) says that the government dislikes inflation, real exchange rate 
volatility, and exchange rate adjustments.  The relative strengths of these dislikes 
are expressed by the parameters d* and C.1 
The government operates monetary policy to fix a rate of inflation of non-traded 
goods (d). Consumer price inflation (p) is jointly determined by d, the rate of 
exchange rate appreciation (e) and foreign inflation (f) as follows: 
  p = a(f – e) + (1 – a)d     0 < a<1     (2) 
By definition the rate of change of the real exchange rate (the price of non-
tradeables relative to tradeables) is given by: 
  q = d – f + e          ( 3 )  
In a pegged regime the government has two degrees of freedom. It can choose 
both inflation (d) and the frequency of devaluation (n) (assuming that d* > f).2  
Given these, it is optimal for devaluations to compensate exactly for inflation 
differentials since the last devaluation, and this will determine the variance of Q.  
Between devaluations, Q increases at the rate d – f. Each devaluation is of size (d 
– f)/n, and  
 E(Q – Q*)2 = (d – f)2/12n2        ( 4 )  
                                                           
1 Implicitly, if d* is higher, we can think of this as the government being less concerned to achieve price 
stability. 
2 Clearly if d* = f, no devaluation is ever necessary, and Q = Q* at all dates.   6
Substitution from (4) into (1) and differentiation with respect to n and d yields 
the optimal solution: 
  d – f = 48(d*-d)3/C2         ( 5 )  
 
Equation (5) shows that the government chooses an inflation rate that is 
intermediate between the foreign rate (f) and that which it would choose under 
flexible exchange rates (d*).  Note that, even though the exchange rate peg has no 
credibility in the sense that devaluations are known to occur with frequency n 
and to compensate fully for accumulated real appreciation, the peg still results in 
lower inflation.  If the cost (C) of exchange rate adjustments is higher, or the 
government values price stability more highly (d* is lower), then inflation is 
lower.  The frequency of devaluations is inversely related to C but increases with 
the inflation differential, since 
 
 n 3 = (d – f)2/ 6 C          ( 6 )  
 
This analysis suggests that, in differentiating between different types of pegged 
regimes, one should focus on the political cost or difficulty of adjusting the 
parity (i.e. C). Assuming that a pre-announced crawl effectively means C close to 
zero and an infinite value of n, a “soft” peg that can be converted into a pre-
announced crawl at any time arguably has a low value of C. On the other hand, 
if parity changes require the agreement of other countries (as in the European 
Monetary System or the CFA), then C is likely to be higher. Currency board 
arrangements, in which domestic monetary policy is automatically tightened in 
response to foreign reserve losses, are generally backed by strong commitments 
not to devalue.  We classify currency boards and shared currencies (e.g. the 
CFA) as “hard pegs” on the grounds that they effectively have high values of C.    7
Thus we anticipate lower inflation for hard pegs than for soft pegs, and 
(probably) for soft pegs than for floats. 
 
What about the choice of exchange rate regime?  If the exchange rate is floated, 
the government hits its inflation target d* and does not incur any devaluation 
costs (C).  It therefore chooses to float if 
 L peg > E(Q – Q*)2float         ( 7 )  
 
where Lpeg is the value of the loss function under pegging, as given by (1), and 
E(Q – Q*)2float is real exchange rate variance under floating.  This is more likely if 
real exchange rate variance under floating is higher (perhaps because of greater 
terms-of-trade volatility), if the government is less averse to inflation (d* is 
higher), or if perceived devaluation costs are larger (C is higher). 
 
As far as the relationship between exchange rate regimes and inflation is 
concerned, there is two-way causality here: pegging reduces the inflation rate 
relative to floating, but countries with higher inflation propensities are more 
likely to choose to float.  In testing the former hypothesis, we need to worry 
about potential endogeneity from the latter effect. 
 
A further complication is that the theoretical model may not apply in some 
situations, particularly the outlying observations when inflation is very high.  It 
strains credulity to say that economies in such a state have chosen to be there 
through some optimising procedure.  It seems more likely that they have 
resorted to seigniorage financing of fiscal deficits as a default mechanism in the 
face of a deadlock between alternatives.  In other words, they have succumbed 
to an inflationary crisis precisely out of a failure to optimise, perhaps because of 
an inability to agree on the form of the loss function in view of the distributional   8
issues involved.3  These outlying observations are likely to have great leverage in 
any empirical test, but are best characterised as states of inflationary crisis in 
which the theoretical model breaks down and d > d*. 
 
The standard method of attempting to exit from such an inflationary crisis is 
some form of exchange-rate-based stabilisation (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1986).  
This involves pegging the exchange rate, but does not necessarily represent a 
shift to pegging, if previously some form of crawling peg was in operation rather 
than a float.4  Nevertheless, if the exchange rate floats in a significant proportion 
of inflationary-crisis observations, we will observe a tendency for high inflation 
to be associated with a higher probability of a switch to a peg.  This is the 
opposite prediction to that of the theoretical model developed above.  Moreover, 
this effect is likely to bias standard Hausman-type tests in favour of a rejection of 
endogeneity, thereby attributing greater causality to the exchange rate regime 
than is justified. 
 
The standard instrumental variable approach to the endogeneity problem does 
not work well in this case for several reasons.  One is that we lack good models 
of exchange rate regime choice, so it is difficult to find suitable instruments for 
the ERR (Juhn and Mauro, 2002).  Another is that many potential instruments 
may themselves be significant determinants of inflation and should be included 
in a fully specified inflation regression, so that there would be an omitted 
variable bias in treating them instead as instruments for the ERR.  In addition, 
inflationary crises and exchange-rate-based stabilisations (ERBSs) complicate the 
issue of endogeneity.  Instead of two possibilities, there are essentially three: that 
the exchange rate regime is always exogenous to inflation, that it is exogenous 
                                                           
3 See, for example, the model of delayed stabilisation in Alesina and Drazen (19**). 
4 This statement presumes that a crawling peg is counted as a peg and not as some form of intermediate 
regime, as has sometimes been the case.  We discuss these classification issues in the next section.   9
except in the case of ERBSs, when high inflation tends to trigger a switch to a 
peg, and that it is always endogenous. 
 
Our approach to the endogeneity issue proceeds in four steps, the first of which 
is more of an exploration of the data. 
(1)  Splitting the sample of countries into those that have switched regime and those that 
have not.  Ignoring the case of ERBSs for the moment, if the ERR is exogenous 
and inflation reacts quickly to switches in the ERR, switchers should yield 
the same results as non-switchers.  If inflation only adjusts slowly to 
switches in the ERR, there will be smaller differences in inflation rates across 
ERRs in the switcher sample than in the non-switcher sample.  If the ERR is 
endogenous, differences in inflation rates across ERRs in the switcher sample 
may be very small, because the switcher sample may be dominated by 
countries whose inflation rates are such that they are more or less indifferent 
between floating and pegging.  Since ERBSs occur at high inflation, they will 
tend to raise the average inflation rate of switchers currently pegging, which 
complicates the picture. 
(2)  Adding fixed (country) effects and/or lagged inflation to the regression of inflation 
on exchange rate regime dummies.  The motivation for this is that if the 
exchange rate regime is endogenous and  inflation is persistent, then both 
current inflation and the ERR will be explained by the fixed effects (or lagged 
inflation), and the partial correlation between the exchange rate regime and 
current inflation will disappear.  In effect the fixed effects (or lagged 
inflation) will substitute for a structural model of the inflation process. 
(3)  A Granger causality test between switches of exchange rate regime and changes in 
the inflation rate.  This is a standard method for distinguishing the direction of 
causality.  We implement this test both for either-way switches (i.e. the 
dummy takes the value 1 (switch) or 0 (no switch)) and distinguishing the 
direction of switch (the dummy takes the value 1 (switch to float), 0 (no   10
switch) or –1 (switch to peg)).  The former specification assumes identical 
effects whatever the direction of switch, and the latter assumes opposite but 
equal effects for opposite directions of switch. 
(4)  A probit analysis of regime switches using the lagged level of inflation.  Note that 
the probit analysis uses the level rather than the change in the inflation rate, 
unlike the Granger causality tests.  This tests whether the likelihood of a 
switch of ERR varies significantly with the level of inflation. 
Since most countries on hard pegs (principally the CFA) have never switched 
regime, the last two tests are implemented on a sample omitting these countries, 
using switches between soft pegs and floats only. 
 
Table 1 summarises the predictions of three hypotheses with respect to each of 
these tests: (1) the exchange rate regime is exogenous throughout; (2) that it is 
exogenous except for ERBSs; and (3) that it is endogenous.  Each row of the table 
represents a different test, and each column a different hypothesis. 
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Table 1.  Predictions of various hypotheses about exchange rate regime 
endogeneity 
  ERR exogenous   ERR exogenous 
except for ERBSs 
ERR endogenous  
Average inflation 
















Peg < float  Peg < float  No effect 
Granger causality 
test 
Switch to peg 
causes lower 
inflation; switch 
to float causes 
higher inflation.  
Change in 
inflation does not 
cause regime 
switch. 
Switch to peg 
causes lower 
inflation; switch 
to float causes 
higher inflation.  
Increase in 
inflation may 
cause switch to 
peg at very high 
inflation rates. 
Change in regime 






Probit for regime 
switches 
No effect  Switch to peg 
more likely at 
very high 
inflation 
Switch in either 
direction more 
likely at higher 
inflation rates 
 
The reasoning behind Table 1 is as follows.  If the ERR is exogenous, then 
countries’ inflation rates will be correlated with the proportion of the time that 
they floated, making switchers likely to have an intermediate level of average 
inflation.  Allowing for ERBSs changes that, because countries with inflationary 
crises are likely to be switchers, thus pulling up the average for this category, 
possibly to a level above that of permanent floaters.  In a fixed-effects inflation 
regression, the ERR effect should disappear if this variable is endogenous, 
because the determinants of inflation will be largely taken out by the fixed 
effects (or by the inclusion of lagged inflation in the regression), but should be 
maintained if the ERR is exogenous.  In effect, if the ERR is endogenous, then 
lagged inflation (or country effects) will explain both current inflation and the   12
ERR, and the ERR will become insignificant in an inflation regression that 
includes these variables.  The predictions of the probit and the Granger causality 
tests are fairly self-evident, the only complication being the possibility of an 




3. Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes  
 
There are two approaches to the problem of classifying exchange rate 
regimes: a de jure classification based on the stated commitment of the Central 
Bank and a de facto classification based on the observed behaviour of the 
exchange rate.  The de facto approach was given impetus by the observation, after 
the Asian crisis, that many of the countries involved were effectively pegging to 
the U.S. dollar, even though their announced regime was a basket peg or even a 
managed float.  The de facto approach is labour-intensive, and liable to produce 
strange results if an inappropriate procedure is used.  It is probably best 
regarded as a useful check on the de jure classification. 
 
We construct a data set based on the IMF classification scheme, which 
until the mid-1990s was based exclusively on countries’ own official definition of 
their ERR. There are two main difficulties involved in this. One is that the IMF 
system has not remained invariant across years. The other is that there are more 
categories than can be conveniently used in an empirical test, so there is an 
aggregation problem.  The most common way to deal with this aggregation 
problem is to reduce the categories to two (pegged and floating) or three 
(pegged, intermediate and floating). The latter type of aggregation (pegged, 
intermediate, floating) has been used by many previous authors (Collins (1996),   13
Ghosh et al. (1997)5, Bailiu, Lafrance and Perrault (2000), Bénassy-Quéré (2000), 
and Masson (2000)). 
 
We have two major criticisms of this system of aggregation. The first is 
the treatment of “crawling pegs and bands”. These are usually placed in the 
Intermediate category, presumably on the grounds that the authorities are not 
wedded to a fixed parity. The problem is that pegs only crawl because of a 
significant inflation problem. Classifying crawling pegs differently from other 
pegs is therefore likely to create a type of “classification endogeneity” in any test 
of the ERR/inflation relationship, whereby pegs with high inflation become 
categorised as non-pegs.  Our second criticism is that it makes no distinction 
between “soft” and “hard” pegs, although theory suggests that inflation rates 
may be quite different in the two categories (and empirical evidence supports 
this hypothesis - Bleaney and Fielding (2002) find a highly significant CFA 
effect). The distinction between soft and hard pegs (such as currency unions or 
currency boards) was not made in the IMF classification until December 31st 
1997, but it is not difficult to reconstruct the category for previous years.  
 
The source for the classification of the exchange rate regime for each 
country was the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions. The layout of these reports has been changing over the years, which 
makes it difficult to create consistent criteria for grouping all the countries over 
the years on exchange rate regime categories. Essentially we aggregate the eight 
IMF classifications into three categories: 
(1) Hard Peg (No Separate Legal Tender; Currency Board); 
(2) Soft Peg (Peg to a Single Currency, Peg to a Composite of Currencies, 
Crawling Pegs and Bands, Limited Flexibility); 
                                                           
5 For the main results Ghosh et al. (1997) consider these three categories, which were disaggregated in nine 
categories for the robustness tests.     14
Floats (Managed Floating; Independently Floating).  Details of how we 
dealt with these issues appear in the Appendix. 
 
We check our results against the de facto classification of Bubula and Ötke-
Robe (2002), hitherto called the BR classification. These authors attempt to 
backdate to 1990 the more de facto approach adopted by the IMF since 1999, 
paying attention to the historical behaviour of the exchange rate and to policy 
announcements.  Relative to the official IMF classification up to 1998, the BR 
classification defines about 20% more of the observations as pegs of various 
kinds and about 20% fewer as floats. 
 
The BR classification is disaggregated into 13 categories, which are 
grouped into Hard Pegs regimes, Intermediate regimes and Floating regimes. 
Their Hard Pegs regimes coincide with our classification – no separate legal 
tender (formal dollarisation and currency union), and currency boards. Their 
intermediate regime includes soft pegs and tightly managed floats. The broad 
pegs are: conventional fixed pegs (vis-à-vis a single currency, and vis-à-vis a 
basket), horizontal bands, crawling pegs (forward-looking and backward-
looking), and crawling bands (forward-looking, and backward-looking). The 
floating category includes other managed floats with no predetermined 
exchange rate path and independently floating. 
 
In order to make a comparison of results with the IMF classification we 
aggregate the BR classification in the same way: into hard pegs, soft pegs and 
floating.  One difference between BR’s aggregation and our is that we treat 
“tightly managed floats” as Floats rather than “Intermediate”.  
 
   15
4.  Data and Descriptive Analysis 
 
Our sample covers annual observations for 102 developing countries (see 
Appendix I) over the period 1984 to 2000, excluding countries in transition.   
Other countries which experienced periods of war or which had incomplete data 
were also omitted. 
  
  Our analysis uses “transformed inflation” in percentage form 
(100π/(1+π)), where π is the change in the logarithm of the consumer price index 
since the previous year. This is a common practice to reduce the outlier effects of 
high-inflation observations, since it has a maximum of one as inflation tends to 
infinity, but makes little difference at low inflation. The same transformation 
was applied to money growth. As a robustness test we also explore the effect of 
excluding a group of high-inflation countries, which are defined as those with 
average inflation rates greater than 25% or with inflation in any one year greater 
than 170%. 
   16
4.1 Descriptive Analysis: IMF Classification 
 
Graph 1 shows the evolution of exchange rate regimes over time, using 
Classification Two. In 1984 Soft Pegs were the dominant regime (62.7% of the 
sample, against 19.6% Hard Pegs, and 17.6% Floating regimes).  From 1984 to 
1995, the number of Soft Pegs fell by 37 (out of 102), and the number of Floats 
increased by 34. After 1995 this tendency was reversed: there was a net gain of 9 
Soft Pegs (more precisely to Crawling Pegs and Bands, and Pegs to a Single 
Currency), and a net loss of 9 Floats.  At the disaggregated level, the decline was 
greatest for a Peg to a Composite of Countries, and the increase was greatest for 
Independently Floating.  The number of countries classified as Hard Pegs is 
virtually unchanged over this period. 
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Inflation rates in developing countries began to decrease after 1990, 
except for 1994 when inflation increased considerably as a result of the 
devaluation in the CFA Zone. Since then inflation has been decreasing sharply 
through the decade. Hard Peg is the category with the lowest inflation over the  
period, with the exception of 1994 when the CFA Zone devalued (Graph 2). The 
average inflation 1984-2000 was 3% for Hard Pegs, 11.5% Soft Pegs and 15.6% for 
Floating regimes for the whole sample (for the sub-sample that excludes high-
inflation countries the figures are respectively 3%, 8.1% and 9.9%). 
 
Floating regimes always have higher inflation than Soft Pegs, but the 
differential is highest during 1991-1995. This is also true for the sub-sample. In 
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  Graph 3 shows that average money growth and inflation across all 
developing countries have moved very closely together over time (but with less 
deceleration of money growth in the late 1990s).  Graph 4 shows that the pattern 
of money growth across exchange rate regimes is very similar to that for 
inflation. The Floating regimes have the highest and the Hard Pegs the lowest 
levels of money growth.  After 1995 the money growth rates across the exchange 
rate regimes converge. This is because of a consistent decrease in Floating 
regimes and an increase in Hard Pegs during the 1990s. The Soft Pegs decreased 
their rate of money growth in the late 1990s to a much smaller degree than the 
Floating regimes. 
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4.2 Comparison of the de jure and de facto classifications 
 
Table 2 shows the frequency of Hard Pegs, Soft Pegs, and Floating 
regimes according to the two classifications.  
 











Hard pegs  355  235  235 
Soft Pegs  737  386  532 
Floating 640  499  355 
 
  According to the de jure classification Soft Pegs are the dominant regime 
in the 1980s. In the 1990s this pattern is reversed with a prevalence of Floating 
regimes over the Soft Pegs.  In contrast, with de facto classifications there are 
more Soft Pegs than Floating regimes.  
 
Table 3: Countries by classification 






Non-switchers:    
    Hard peggers  23 23 23 
    Soft peggers 
(Fixers)  19 20 25 
    Floaters  8 25  14 
Switchers  52 34 40 
Total classified 
countries 
102 102 102 
 
 
                                                           
6 Iraq and Somalia are not classified in 1995.   20
Table 3 shows that during the 1990s the majority of countries stuck to the same 
regime (at this level of aggregation), with more countries identified as switchers 
according to the de facto classification (40 compared with 34).  Using data back to 
1984, just over half of all countries are switchers according to the de jure 
classification.  
 
Table 4 shows the average inflation rates by exchange rate regime for 1984-2000 
and 1990-2000 (IMF) and 1990-2000 (BR).  Hard Peg regimes have consistently 
low levels of inflation, with an average below 5% p.a.  Floating regimes have an 
average of about 15% p.a., and Soft Pegs are intermediate between these two 
extremes. When the sample is divided into Switchers and Non-Switchers, it 
becomes clear that Switchers have similar inflation rates to Permanent Floaters, 
and much higher rates than Permanent Peggers (Hard or Soft).  Table 4 shows 
that this is because Switchers currently pegging have much higher inflation rates 
than Permanent Peggers.  Table 5 shows that the same relationships hold for 
money growth. 
   21







Hard  pegs  2.90 4.08 4.08 
Soft  Pegs  11.72 9.49 11.51 
15.99 15.39 14.83  Floating 
Observations  1480 975  975 
Non-switchers     
  Hard peggers  6.54 6.14 6.14 
  Fixers  8.64 6.95 8.76 
  Floaters  15.54 13.77 13.48 
Switchers  14.24 14.50 14.53 
  
Currently floating  15.08 15.78 15.54 
 Currently pegging  13.30 12.84 13.63 




Table 5: Average money growth transformed (% p.a.) 




Hard pegs  3.80  5.39 
Soft Pegs  13.77  13.57 
Floating 17.44  16.60 
Observations 1529  995 
Non-switchers    
  Hard peggers  7.12 6.91 
  Fixers  11.58 11.51 
  Floaters  19.66 15.68 
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5. Empirical Analysis  
 
We estimate a pooled model with ERR dummies and year dummies. The 
year dummies prevent the results from being contaminated by a time-series 
relationship between exchange rate regimes and inflation in the average country.  
The model effectively estimates a cross-section relationship which is pooled 
across years, and ignores the time-series dimension. 
 
We check that the estimates are robust to the exclusion of high-inflation 
countries by reporting results for a sub-sample omitting these countries. The 
ERR regime dummies (which correspond to the ERR regime as of 31 December) 
are lagged one period, so that inflation in 1990, say, is regressed on the ERR as at 
31 December 1989. The omitted category is Soft Pegs, so coefficients of the other 
regimes (Hard Pegs and Floating) should be interpreted as inflation differentials 
relative to the Soft Peg regime. 
 
The results of this test for the de jure classification are shown in Table 6.  
Table 6 shows that Hard Pegs have 5.1% less (transformed) inflation than Soft 
Pegs (when high-inflation countries are omitted), while Floats have 2.0% more 
inflation, with both coefficients significant at the 0.01 level.  If the sample is 
divided into Switcher and Non-Switcher countries, the effects are still 
significant, but smaller for switcher countries (especially when high-inflation 
countries are included, probably because of the effects of exchange-rate-based 
stabilisations). 
 
Table 7 shows that, if fixed country effects or lagged inflation are included 
in the regression, the fit improves dramatically, and the Hard Peg dummy 
remains significantly negative, but the Float dummy is always insignificant.7  
                                                           
7 The Hard Peg dummy cannot be estimated for the sub-sample because of collinearity with the fixed 
effects.   23
This suggests strongly that Hard Pegs help to maintain monetary discipline and 
reduce inflation, but that Soft Pegs do not, with the choice between Soft Pegs and 
Floats reflecting inflationary experience rather than determining it.  We examine 
this hypothesis in more detail below by performing Granger causality tests and a 
probit analysis of switches of exchange rate regime. 
 
Tables 8 and 9 show the results of equivalent exercises with the de facto 
(BR) classification.  Table 8 is very similar to Table 6, except that the Float 
dummy is not significant for the Switcher country sample (excluding high-
inflation countries).  In addition, the Hard Peg dummies have slightly smaller 
(although still highly significant) coefficients.  Table 9 shows that the Hard Peg 
dummy remains significantly negative with fixed effects and lagged inflation.  
The Float dummy always has a positive coefficient, but not one that is 
consistently significant.   24
Table 6: Inflation and Exchange Rate Regimes (de jure Classification) 
 IMF:  1984-2000 
















Hard Peg   -8.24***  -5.13***  -5.805***  -3.890***     
  dummy  (12.54)  (11.08)  (7.17)  (7.75)     
Floating    5.345*** 2.046*** 10.38*** 2.552*** 2.812**  1.685** 
  dummy  (6.42)  (4.43)  (6.31) (3.73) (2.59) (2.49) 
Obs.  1398 1127 671  582  727  545 
Adj  R-sq  0.17 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.08 0.09 
Root  MSE  12.754 6.4787 12.00  5.5229 13.252 7.2253 
Dependent variable: inflation transformed [π/(1+ π)]% 
Dropped regime: Soft Pegs.  Sub-sample omits high-inflation countries 
 
 
Table 7: With Fixed Effects and Inflation Persistence (de jure Classification) 
  Fixed Effects  Lagged Inflation 
 All  sample  Sub-sample  All sample  Sub-sample 
Hard Peg   -38.860***    -1.567***  -1.960*** 
  dummy  (10.72)    (3.34)  (4.76) 
Floating dummy  -0.470  -0.206  0.176  0.483 
 (0.61)  (0.38)  (0.40)  (1.41) 
Lagged inflation      0.842***  0.635*** 
     (29.93)  (21.97) 
Observations 1398  1127  1386  1118 
No. of countries  92  74     
Root MSE  8.805  5.235  6.803  5.026 
AdjR-squared 0.63  0.50  0.76  0.52 
Dependent variable : inflation transformed [π/(1+ π)]% 
Dropped regime: Soft Pegs.  Sub-sample omits high-inflation countries 
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Table 8: Inflation and Exchange Rate Regimes (de facto Classification) 
 BR:  1990-2000 
















Hard  Peg    -7.138*** -4.119*** -5.620*** -2.202***    
    dummy  (9.68) (7.04) (6.85) (3.75)    
Floating  dummy  4.028*** 2.322*** 3.304*** 3.777*** 4.646*** 0.530 
  (3.91) (3.82) (3.01) (5.33) (2.62) (0.54) 
Obs.  887 716 533 434 353 281 
Adj  R-sq  0.16 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.11 0.10 
Root  MSE  11.491  6.475 9.073 5.456 14.187  7.391 
Dependent variable : inflation transformed [π/(1+ π)]% 





Table 9: With Fixed Effects and Inflation Persistence (de facto Classification) 
  Fixed effects  Lagged Inflation 
 All  sample  Sub-sample  All sample  Sub-sample 
Hard Peg   -24.864***    -1.536**  -1.126** 
  dummy  (5.72)    (2.48)  (2.12) 
Floating dummy  1.856**  0.695  0.178  0.937** 
 (2.08)  (1.05)  (0.32)  (2.11) 
Lagged inflation      0.765***  0.632*** 
     (19.73)  (17.33) 
Observations 887  716  881  710 
No. of countries  92  74     
Root MSE  7.443  4.903  6.627  4.998 
Adj R-squared  0.68  0.58  0.72  0.52 
Dependent variable : inflation transformed [π/(1+ π)]% 
Dropped regime: Soft Pegs.  Sub-sample omits high-inflation countries 
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In Tables 10 to 13 the same exercises are repeated for money growth.  The 
results for Hard Pegs are similar to those for inflation: the coefficient is always 
negative and significant.  For Floats, the coefficient is positive and usually 
significant (although not always so for the de facto classification), but always 
insignificant and often negative when the regression is augmented by fixed 
effects.  With lagged money growth, the Floating dummy is significantly positive 
with the de jure classification but not with the de facto classification.  Thus it 
appears that the choice between Soft Pegs and Floats does not affect dynamics of 
the money supply, but the choice of a Hard Peg reduces monetary growth.   27
Table 10: Money Growth and Exchange Rate Regimes (de jure Classification) 
















Hard  Peg    -9.410*** -6.978*** -7.684*** -6.077***    
    dummy  (8.81) (6.87) (6.00) (5.19)    
Floating  dummy  4.607*** 1.713**  9.323*** 3.513*** 2.958**  1.785* 
  (5.13) (2.38) (5.27) (3.02) (2.51) (1.68) 
Obs  1441 1167 694  605  747  562 
AdjR-sq  0.13 0.10 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.05 
Root  MSE  15.013 11.883 15.689 12.589 14.199 10.855 
Dependent variable: money transformed [m/(1+ m)]% 




Table 11: With Fixed Effects and Money Growth Persistence (de jure 
Classification) 
  Fixed Effects  Lagged Money Growth 
 All  sample  Sub-sample  All sample  Sub-sample 
Hard Peg   -36.802***    -6.059***  -6.622*** 
  dummy  (7.09)    (5.04)  (6.35) 
Floating dummy  -1.000  -1.120  2.371***  1.561** 
 (0.92)  (0.97)  (3.02)  (2.15) 
Lagged money      .380***  0.0536 
growth     (5.82)  (1.12) 
Observations 1441  1167  1434  1163 
No. of countries  92  74     
Root MSE  12.662  11.523  13.748  11.887 
Adj R-squared  0.25  0.20  0.27  0.10 
Dependent variable : money transformed [m/(1+ m)]% 
Dropped regime: Soft Pegs.   Sub-sample excludes high-inflation countries 
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Table 12: Money Growth and Exchange Rate Regimes (de facto Classification) 
















Hard  Peg    -8.219*** -6.138*** -6.767*** -4.485***    
    dummy  (6.35) (4.82) (4.74) (3.22)    
Floating  dummy  2.733** 1.519  3.067** 3.135** 2.464  0.136 
  (2.54) (1.63) (2.36) (2.38) (1.46) (0.11) 
Observations  904 731 547 447 356 283 
AdjR-sq  0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 
Root  MSE  13.825 11.523 13.643 12.527 13.895 9.3377 
Dependent variable: money transformed [m/(1+ m]% 




Table 13: With Fixed Effects and Money Growth Persistence (de facto 
Classification) 
  Fixed Effects  Lagged Money Growth 
  All sample  Subsample  All sample  Subsample 
Hard Peg   -22.313***    -5.216***  -5.462*** 
  dummy  (3.21)    (3.75)  (4.11) 
Floating dummy  0.060  -0.379  1.093  1.124 
 (0.04)  (0.26)  (1.16)  (1.21) 
Lagged money      0.368***  0.11 
growth     (5.54)  (1.60) 
Observations 904  731  900  728 
Root MSE  11.917  11.088  12.819  11.482 
Adj R-squared  0.40  0.24  0.24  0.11 
No. of countries  92  74     
Dependent variable: money transformed [m/(1+ m)]% 
Dropped regime: Soft Pegs.  Sub-sample omits high-inflation countries 
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We now perform a Granger causality test between changes in exchange 
rate regime (excluding Hard Pegs, for which there were very few regime 
switches anyway) and changes in the inflation rate.  The principle of the test is 
that if lagged changes in the ERR are significant in a regression for changes in 
the inflation rate, we can conclude that changes in the ERR cause changes in 
inflation.  If lagged changes in inflation are significant in a regression for 
changes in the ERR, then we can conclude that changes in inflation cause 
changes in ERRs (bidirectional causality is a possible conclusion).  A 
complication is that a change in the ERR can be formulated in two ways.   One is 
as the first difference of the Float dummy (switch to float = 1; no switch = 0; 
switch to peg = -1); the other is as the absolute value of this (switch either way = 
1; no switch = 0).  Results for both formulations are shown in Table 14 for the 
IMF classification.  In the regression for changes in inflation, we allow for 
different coefficients according to the direction of switch, but none is significant.  
When high-inflation countries are included, however, the lagged change in 
inflation has a positive coefficient in the regression for ERR changes, whichever 
specification is used.  This suggests that a rise in inflation tends to trigger a 
switch of ERR, and is consistent with causality running from inflation to ERR 
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Table 14: Granger Causality Tests 



























































Observations  1028 817  1093 869  1093 869 
Adj  R-sq  0.04  0.048  0.0285 0.0329 0.0433 0.0511 














The earlier finding that Switcher countries had higher average inflation 
than Non-switchers suggests that the probability of an ERR switch may be 
positively correlated with the inflation rate.  In fact, amongst Switcher countries, 
there is a significant positive correlation between the average inflation rate and 
the frequency of regime switches.  To examine this hypothesis more formally, we 
undertake a probit analysis of switches of regime.  We do this separately for 
countries that were on a Soft Peg and those that were Floating in the previous 
year.  We include a time dummy to allow for possible shifts over time in the 
relevant probabilities.  What emerges from Table 15 is that both a switch to a peg 
(for currently floating countries) and a switch to a float (for currently pegging 
countries) get significantly more probable as inflation increases.  The coefficient   31
is about three times as great in the case of a switch to a float.  This is consistent 
with the idea that with moderately high inflation, a switch to a float is more 
likely than at low inflation, but that with very high inflation, a switch to a peg 
becomes more likely (as happens in an exchange-rate-based stabilisation).  In 
addition, a switch to a float has become significantly more probable over time at 
any given rate of inflation, as indicated by the significant positive coefficient of 
the time trend in this regression. 
Table 15 is based on the de jure  classification for 1984-2000.  Table 16 
shows the results for 1990-2000 using both classifications.  For each classification 
the inflation coefficient is positive but insignificant in the case of a switch to a 
peg, perhaps because exchange-rate-based stabilisations were becoming rarer 
after 1989, but it is still significant for a switch to a float. 
 
Table 15: Probit analysis of likelihood of ERR switch (de jure classification) 
 ERR  Switch 
 1984-2000 
  Switch to a Peg   Switch to a float 
Inflation 0.0012**  0.0033*** 
 (2.05)  (4.99) 
Time   0.0019  0.0074*** 
 (0.78)  (3.15) 
No. of obs.  502  599 
Pseudo-R2 0.016  0.0755 
Wald χ2  4.64 32.83 
 
Table 16: Probit analysis of likelihood of ERR switch (1990-2000) 
  ERR Switch: 1990-2000 
 IMF  BR 




Switch to a 
Peg  
Switch to a 
Float 
Inflation 0.0007 0.0061***  0.0009  0.0028*** 
  (1.01) (5.20) (1.06)  (2.78) 
Time    0.0044 0.0074 -0.00  0.0044 
  (1.18) (1.51) (1.38)  (0.91) 
No. of obs.  408  358  269  427 
Pseudo-R2  0.0098 0.1008 0.0255  0.0264 
Wald χ2  1.75 32.45  4.14  7.96   32
6. Conclusions 
 
The theoretical analysis suggested that pegs would be associated with 
lower inflation than floats, provided that the costs of devaluation were 
significant.  Whether the costs of devaluation represent a major deterrent to 
inflation in any given form of peg is an empirical question.  In our empirical 
work we distinguished Hard Pegs (a shared currency or a currency board) from 
other forms of Peg (Soft pegs), on the grounds that the obstacles or disincentives 
to devaluation are much higher for Hard Pegs. 
 
Our empirical findings show that Hard Pegs are characterised by lower 
inflation and monetary growth than Soft Pegs, which in turn have slightly less 
inflation and monetary growth than Floats.  When we allowed for persistence in 
inflation and monetary growth (which is strong, and therefore significantly 
improves the fit of the regressions), the Float dummy became insignificant, 
whereas the Hard Peg dummy remained significant.  This suggests that past 
inflation is explaining both current inflation and the choice between a Soft Peg 
and a Float (i.e. that this choice is endogenous), whereas a decision to choose a 
Hard Peg significantly reduces inflation by imposing monetary discipline. 
 
Our results for the choice between Soft pegs and Floats were confirmed 
by Granger causality tests, which showed that increases in inflation cause a 
switch of regime, but not vice versa.  In a probit analysis, the probability of a 
switch to a Float increases significantly with inflation, and in the 1980s (but not 
the 1990s, when major inflationary problems and exchange-rate-based 
stabilisations were rarer) the probability of a switch to a Peg also increases 
significantly with the inflation rate.  In general, countries with low inflation are 
likely to stay on a peg, whereas countries with higher inflation are likely to float 
or to switch between pegging and floating.   33
 
There has been much anxiety recently about official misrepresentation of 
the exchange rate regime in force.  This anxiety seems overdone in this case, 
since we obtained very similar results using a classification based on what 
countries do rather than what they say. 
 
Ghosh et al. (2002, p. 173) conclude unequivocally that “pegged exchange 
rates are associated with significantly better inflation performance” and that 
“this is an important benefit for the majority of developing and emerging market 
countries where policy credibility may be lower”.  Bleaney and Fielding (2000, 
2002), Edwards (1993) and Ghosh et al. (1997) reach similar conclusions. By 
contrast we find that this is true only for Hard Pegs – there are no credibility 
gains from Soft Pegs.  Our results are different for three reasons.  One is that 
previous authors have not always distinguished between Hard and Soft Pegs.  
Another is that in previous investigations of this issue Crawling Pegs and Bands 
have often been classified as intermediate regimes.  Both of these differences 
would reduce the apparent inflation rate for Soft Pegs.  Finally, other authors 
have often not tested the robustness of the estimated ERR coefficients in inflation 
regressions to the inclusion of other variables in the model (notably past 
inflation and fixed country effects), that greatly improve the fit, so that their 
results suffer from a mis-specification bias. 
 
The absence of any credibility benefits from soft pegs reinforces the 
argument for preferring some form of float (managed or otherwise) or a Hard 
Peg for countries exposed to sizeable capital inflows and outflows.  In practice, 
Soft Pegs remain the most popular regime choice for developing countries which 
do not have inflationary problems. 
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APPENDIX 
 
  Until 1995 the IMF reports three basic exchange rate arrangements: 
a) peg to a single currency distinguishing between i)U.S. dollar, ii) pound 
sterling, iii) the French franc, iv) peg to other currencies and v) peg to a 
composite of currencies being indicated when the composite is a Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR). b) limited flexibility with respect to i) single currency and 
ii) co-operative arrangements; and c) more flexible arrangements: i) adjusted 
according to a set of indicators, ii) other managed floating, iii)independently 
floating. 
  In the IMF Reports relating to 1997 and 1998 the “Flexibility limited” 
category does not consider any more the subdivision into “single currency” and 
“cooperative arrangements”. Amongst the “More flexible arrangements”, the 
“adjusted according to a set of indicators” disappears, therefore presenting only 
“Managed floating” category, (which includes what was considered till then as 
“adjusted according to a set of indicators” and “other managed floating”). 
After 1998 IMF reports a more detailed classification considering eight 
categories: no separate legal tender, currency boards, conventional pegged 
arrangement (making distinction if it is a single currency or a composite of 
currencies), pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands, crawling pegs, 
crawling bands, managed floating with no-preannounced path for the exchange 
rate (dirty float) and independently floating. Lately, the IMF is aware that de facto 
exchange rate arrangements are different than the one announced by the 
countries, therefore, now IMF considers de facto policies in its classification. For 
instance, Jordan who in the years 1999 and 2000 had a de jure peg to the SRD but 
a de facto peg to the U.S. dollar is classified as peg to a single currency. 
Since the construction of the classifications based on IMF Reports are not 
straightforward, some operations and assumptions had to be done, which were 
the following.   37
The crawling peg and bands category was disaggegated from the 
“Managed floating” category (IMF Report relating to 1996 and 1997). Looking at 
the countries which we suspect were crawling bands and pegs (Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uruguay and Venezuela), we analysed the behaviour of the monthly exchange 
rate which suggest a crawling peg/band behaviour except in the case of 
Colombia. This classification does not coincide with that of Ghosh et al. (1997), 
which considers that only Chile has a crawling band in the period in analysis.  
For 1998-2000 period we assume that currencies maintain the peg as 
before in order to distinguish peg to a single currency and peg to a composite of 
currencies, which are aggregated under “Other conventional fixed peg 
arrangements” category in IMF Reports.  
The hard peg categories required the separation of these categories from the 
pegs to a single currency reported until 1997. 
The countries considered as no separate legal tender were the following: i) 
the East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM): Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, 
Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and Grenadines (St. Kitts and Nevis is not 
considered in the sample); ii) the CFA Franc Zone: the West African Economy 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU): Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau (which became part of French Franc Zone on 1st May 1997), Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo. The Central African Economy and Monetary Community 
(CAEMC): Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea and Gabon (although Comoros has the same arrangement with the 
French Treasury as do the CFA Franc Zone Countries is classified as peg); iii) 
Panama which adopted the dollar as legal tender in 1904. Considered as 
Currency Boards were Djibouti and Argentina. Argentina set up its currency 
board in 1991, however since the inflation figure for 1991 will reflect pre-CB 
events, so the hard peg dummy starts in 1992.  
   38
APPENDIX (continuation) 
As Reported by IMF for Exchange Rate Arrangements   
Until 1995  1996-1997  1998-2000 
Hard pegs  Subset from the pegs to a single 
currency 
Subset from the pegs to a single 
currency 
No separate legal tender and 
currency boards 
Broad Pegs  Peg to a single and composite of 
currencies, limited flexibility with 
respect to a single currency and 
cooperative arrangements, and more 
flexible arrangements adjusted 
according to a set of indicators 
Pegged to a single  and composite 
of currencies, flexibility limited and 
the crawling pegs/bands subset 
from managed floating 
conventional peg arrangements, 
pegged exchange rate within 


















Floating  Other managed floating and 
independently floating 
Managed floating (after excluded 
the crawling peg/ band) and 
Independently floating 
Managed floating with no pre-
announced path for the exchange 
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As Reported by IMF for Exchange Rate Arrangements   
Until 1995  1996-1997  1998-2000 
No separate Legal 
tender 
Subset from Peg to a single 
currency 
Subset from Peg to a single 
currency 
No separate legal tender 
Currency Board  Subset from peg to a single 
currency 
Subset from peg to a single 
currency 
Currency board 
Peg to a single 
currency (USD, 
FF, GBP) 
Peg to a single currency (report 
provides information which is the 
anchor currency) 
Peg to a single currency (report 
provides information which is the 
anchor currency) 
Subset from Conventional Peg 
arrangements (is assumed that the 
currency keeps the same anchor) 
Peg to Other 
Single currency 
Peg to a single currency (report 
provides information which is the 
anchor currency) 
Peg to a single currency (report 
provides information which is the 
anchor currency) 
Subset from Conventional Peg 
arrangements (is assumed that the 
currency keeps the same anchor) 
Crawling 
Peg/Band 
More Flexible arrangements 
adjusted according to a set of 
indicators 
Subset from Managed Floating 
according to the analysis of the 
exchange rate behaviour 
Crawling pegs and Bands 
Limited 
Flexibility 
Limited Flexibility with respect to 
a single currency and cooperative 
arrangements 




Other  managed  floating  Managed floating after excluded 
the crawling peg/band 
Managed floating with no pre-





















Independently floating  Independently floating  Independently floating 
 
 